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JAPANESE AND U.S. DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE 
TO THE PHILIPPINES: A PHILIPPINE PERSPECTIVE 
Filologo Pante, Jr. and Romeo A. Reyes* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Japanese and U.S. official development assistance (ODA) to 
the Philippines have played an important role in postwar 
Philippine development. Together, they account for 81.5 percent 
of the total development assistance flows from bilateral sources 
and nearly 40 percent of development assistance flows from both 
bilateral and multilateral sources during the period 1952-1986. 
Over the years, the volume, composition and direction of 
Japanese and U.S. ODA to the Philippines have been changing. In 
the future, the question is how these elements should evolve in 
order to maximize the contribution of the two countries' 
assistance to the achievement of Philippine development goals. 
This paper presents a Philippine perspective on Japanese and 
U.S. ODA to the Philippines. It does not attempt to quantify the 
contribution of such assistance to development, aware of the 
pitfalls and difficulty of impact assessment. Rather, it reviews 
the flows of Japanese and US assistance in terms of both quantity 
and quality arid indicates some possible directions regarding the 
future role of Japanese and U.S. development assistance to the 
Philippines. 
^President, Philippine Institute for Development Studies 
(PIDS), and Assistant Director-General, National Economic and 
Development.. Authority (NEDA) . The valuable research assistance 
provided by Ms. Fe G. Seligman is gratefully acknowledged. 
2 
Section 2 provides a brief historical background of Japanese 
and U.S. ODA to the Philippines. Section 3 contains a 
comparative analysis of Japanese and U.S. ODA to the Philippines 
in terms of their size, composition, interest rate and term 
structure, sectoral allocation, procurement, and planning and 
programming, among others. Finally, .Section 4 discusses the 
future role of Japanese and U.S. assistance to the Philippines, 
highlighting a number of ways by which the contribution of such 
assistance to Philippine development can be enhanced. 
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
U.S. development assistance to the Philippines began during 
the postwar period of the 1940s. The Rehabilitation Act (Tydings 
Act) of 1946 provided compensation to Filipinos in the form of 
financial and technical assistance for the reconstruction and 
rehabilitation of roads, bridges and public buildings. A sum of 
$400 million was awarded to the Philippine Government for war 
damage and US$120 million was given for the rebuilding of public 
works and highways in 1946-1948. 
A significant breakthrough was achieved on November 14, 
1950,' with the signing of the Quirino-Foster Memorandum 'of 
Agreement. It created the legal framework establishing economic 
and technical ties between the U.S. and the Philippines and 
formally assured U.S. assistance to the Philippine efforts toward 
economic reconstruction. The agreement provided for the 
following: (1) creation of the U.S. Economic Survey Mission to 
the Philippines which would take charge of assessing the 
Philippine economic situation and providing a program of social 
and economic reforms; (2) formulation of economic measures for 
consideration by the Philippine Congress; (3) provision of 
consultancy services in the field of taxation and revenue 
collection, social legislation and economic development; and (4) 
formation of the Philippine Council for U.S. Aid (PHILCUSA), the 
agency which represented the Philippine Government in its 
transactions with the U.S. Economic Cooperation Administration 
(ECA), ECA had the responsibility for overseeing, advising and 
guiding the Philippine Government in the use of American funds 
and for providing assistance in the implementation of the general 
aims and recommendations of the Economic Survey Mission to the 
Philippines. ECA came to be known later as the U.S. Agency for 
International Development (USAID). As for PHILCUSA, its tasks 
vis-a-vis ECA are now being performed by the National Economic 
and Development Authority (NEDA), which is the central planning 
and policymaking body in the Philippines. 
Japanese development assistance to the Philippines commenced 
later in 1956 with the reparations payments or "baisho." Under 
the reparations agreement, the Philippine Government was to 
receive $550 million in capital goods and technical services from 
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Japan during the period 1956-1976. This amount was to be 
disbursed in the following manner: US$25 million annually for the 
first ten years and US$30 million annually for the succeeding ten 
years. 
Services and products supplied by way of reparations 
consisted of items needed for projects chosen from among those 
enumerated in the Annex of the Agreement,, such as: (1) 
agricultural and fishery development projects; (2) electric power 
development projects; (3) mineral.resources development projects; 
(4) industrial development projects; (5) transportation and 
communications projects; (6) public works projects;. and (.7) other 
projects, such as education, ..health and . social welfare 
facilities, research laboratory and equipment, and training of 
Filipino technicians in Japan. 
: From 1959 to 196.9, the bulk of reparations was devoted to 
public works, transport and communicationseducation and health 
facilities. The reparations program came primarily in the form 
of purchase of Japanese machinery, such as spare parts and raw 
mater ials. 
It can readily be seen from the above that Japanese and U.S. 
development assistance to the Philippines, sprang from the need 'to 
rebuild the Philippine economy after World War XI. This set the 
stage for the more significant role which these two sources of 
official development assistance were to subsequently perform in 
the development of the economy. 
III. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF JAPANESE AND U.S. ODA 
A. Types of Assistance 
1. U.S. Development Assistance 
.U.S. development assistance comes in the form of grants and 
loans. Grants are used primarily to finance the costs of 
technical assistance, training, and commodity procurement to 
support institution building; loans are used to cover the 
requirements of public investment projects. U.S. assistance 
consists of the following programs: (1).Development assistance 
(DA); (2) Economic Support Fund (ESF); (3) U.S. Public Law 480 
(PL 480); and (4) U.S. Agricultural Act of 1949 (Section 416). 
Development Assistance. DA is project oriented, and it has 
the basic aim of promoting the country's economic development and 
welfare. Projects are identified based on specific priorities 
determined by the U.S. Congress. 
Economic Support Fund. ESF is a type of assistance which, 
in the Philippine case is largely tied to the agreement for 
continued American access to the facilities at Clark Air Base and 
Subic Naval Base. Under the 1979 amendment to the Bases 
Agreement, the U.S. government provided US$200 million in ESF 
grants from 1979 to 1984. In the 1983 review, the U.S. agreed to 
provide an additional US$475 million in economic support for 
1985-1989. In 1986, the first year of the Aquino government, ESF 
was utilized purely for budgetary support. This includes the 
US$80 million ESF undisbursed amount under the past 
administration, plus an additional US$220 million obligated in 
1986 consisting of an additional US$120 million bases-related and 
US$100 million nonbases related assistance. In 1987, the 
Philippines was expected to receive approximately US$250 million 
ESF from the U.S., US$150 million of which will be allocated for-
budgetary support. 
. Programs " Under U.S. PL 480. By virtue of the Agricultural 
Trade" Development 'and Assistance Act of 1954 (U.S. PL 480),.; 
support in the form of proceeds from sales of U.S. surplus 
agricultural commodities, to be either loaned or donated, has 
been extended by the U.S. to developing countries, including the 
Philippines. U.S. PL 480 is covered by four (4) titles, namely: 
Title' I which includes commodities that can be sold for foreign 
currencies; Title II which includes commodities that can be 
utilized to supply famine relief and other emergency assistance; 
Title III which includes commodities that can be donated to 
nonprofit voluntary organizations; and Title IV which includes 
commodities that can be sold for dollars under long-term credit 
agreements. Most of the excess agricultural commodities made 
available to the Philippines fall under either Title I or Title 
II. 
Under U.S. PL 480 Title II, food commodities are provided 
on a grant basis, and are distributed through nonprofit 
organizations, such as the Catholic Relief Services (CRS) and the 
Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere (CARE). In 1985, 
nearly US$16 million in food was provided for malnourished 
children through maternal and child health programs and school 
feeding ptojects of the said organizations. About $6 million in 
food was also provided to needy families in Metro Manila. 
U.S. Agricultural Act of 1949 (Section 416). This 
legislation, also 'kno'wn' as" ""An Act to Stabilize Prices of 
Agricultural Commodities," has specifically provided, under 
Section 416, (b)(1), that the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture 
may furnish "eligible commodities" for carrying out programs of 
assistance in developing countries and friendly countries. An 
agreement under this Act was signed on December 2, 1986, allowing 
for local disbursement of 128,500 metric tons of U.S. wheat. 
Proceeds from the sale will be allocated to the following 
activities: (1) supplementary child feeding programs in the 
province of Negros Oriental; (2) payment of transportation costs 
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in the delivery of commodity aids that fall under PL. 480; (3) 
.other supplementary feeding programs of nonprofit, charitable 
organizations not directly supported by a foreign or 
international donor agency; and (4) selected programs of the 
Philippine Department of Agriculture. 
2. Japanese Development Assistance 
Economic cooperation between the Philippines and Japan may 
be classified- into . three categories, namely: (1) loan 
assistance; (2) grant-aid; ana (3) technical cooperation. 
Loan assistance. Japan extends a major portion of its 
development assistance to the Philippines in the form of loans 
through its Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF). From the 
First Yen Credit in 1971, to the 13th Yen Credit in 1986, the 
Philippines' cumulative loan commitment from Japan amounted to 
¥515 billion or approximately US$2.3 billion. 1/ This amount 
includes three special yen credits in 1979, 1983 and 1986 for 
power projects. Commodity loans accounted for..24.3 percent, with 
the remaining 75.7 percent channelled to the energy, transport, 
industry, water resources, agriculture and communications 
sectors. 
Grant aid. In lesser magnitude, Japan extends development 
assistance to the Philippines in the form of capital grants for 
building construction and equipment supply. To date, Japan has 
committed a cumulative total of US$386.18 million (yen 
equivalent) in grant aid. This figure covers 58 projects 
financed under the following categories: general grant-aid (64.3 
percent), cultural grant-aid (0.9 percent), food aid (2.8 
percent), and the remainder for increased food production. 
Technical cooperation. From fiscal years 1954 to 1985, the 
Japanese government pro'vided a total of US$130.58 million (yen 
equivalent) to the Philippines which came in the form of expert 
services, training, master plan and feasibility studies, as well 
as equipment. In 1985-1986, the total amount of assistance 
extended under technical cooperation was US$31.63 million. A 
major portion of this amount was used to finance activities 
involving projects and development surveys. The rest were used 
for training local counterparts, expert dispatch and the 
provision of equipment on a limited scale. 
1/ 
¥ amounts were converted to their dollar equivalent using 
the annual average exchange rates reported in the IMF Financial 
Statistics. — . . 
a 
B. Size of Development Assistance 
ODA flows to the Philippines from multilateral and bilateral 
sources amounted to US$10.8 billion in 1952-1986 on a commitment 
basis (Table 1). Of this amount, 78.1 percent came in the form 
of loans; the balance of 21.9 percent came in the form of grants. 
For the whole period, Japan's share in total ODA was about 
20.0 percent, while that of the U.S. stood at 17.0 percent (Table 
2). However, these percentages do not tell the whole story. In 
the 1950s and the 1960s, the U.S. was clearly the major source of 
development assistance to the Philippines (86.8 percent share in 
1952-1961 and 40.2 percent share in 1962-1970). Japan at this 
time was only a minor donor (negligible share in 1952-1961 and 
6.3 percent share in 1962-1970). 
With the introduction of the Yen Loan Package in the 1970s, 
Japan's share to total ODA leaped from 6.3 percent in the 1960s 
to 15.3 percent in the 1970s and 22.8 percent in the 1980s. 
While U.S. development assistance continued to increase in 
absolute terms, its share in total ODA drastically dropped from 
40.0 percent in the 1960s to 13.0 percent in the 1970s and 14.0 
percent in 1980-1986. In 1986, the Japanese contributed 36.4 
percent of total ODA as compared to the U.S. which contributed 
26.1 percent. 2/ 
C. Composition of Development Assistance Flows 
Table 3 shows a breakdown of Japanese and US ODA in terras of 
loa ns and grants. Two observations can be made from the data in 
the table. First, while the U.S. was a principal source of ODA 
in the form of loans in the 1950s, it became quite a minor 
provider of ODA loans in the following decades. In contrast, 
Japanese ODA loans began to account for a much larger share of 
total ODA loans in the 1970s. Second, the US is the principal 
source of grants among all ODA sources; Japan performs only a 
modest role in this respect, with its contribution becoming 
significant only in the 1970s and still far behind the U.S. both 
in terms of absolute amounts and share in total grants. 
With respect to the loan-grant mix of Japanese and U.S. ODA, 
Table 4 clearly shows the superiority of U.S. ODA. In the 1950s 
and 1960s, grants accounted for over 90.0 percent of total U.S. 
ODA. Though this declined in the 1970s and 1980s, the share of 
grants remained substantial at about 70.0 percent in the 1970s 
and 78.0 percent in 1980-1986. In comparison, Japanese 
assistance since the 1970s has consisted mainly of loans, the 
share of grants being only about 18-20 percent of total Japanese 
ODA to the Philippines. 
y Based on commitments as of September 30, 1986. 
Table 1 
OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE TO THE PHILIPPINES 
1952-1986 
(In US$M) 
Development Assistance 
ODA Loans ODA Grants 
Year Total Amount (%) Amount (%) 
1952-61 265.60 38. 19 (14.4) 227.41 (85.6) 
1962-70 537.76 248 . 20 (46.2) 289.56 (53.8) 
1971-79 2,757.44 2,321. 05 (84.2) 436.39 (15.8) 
1980-86 7,247.87 5,828. 79 • <3 CO 1,419.08 (19.6) 
1952-86 10,808.67 8,436. 23 (78.1) 2,372.44 (21.9) 
Source: External Assistance Staff, NEDA 
USAID 
Table 2 
OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE TO THE PHILIPPINES 
1952-1986 
(In US$M) 
U.S. JAPAN 
Year Amount (%) a/ Amount (%) a/ 
1952-61 230.54 (86.8) 0.08 (0.0) 
1962-70 216.46 (40.2) 34.02 (6.3) 
1971-79 357.86 (13.0) 422.42 (15.3) 
1980-86 1,024.13 (14.1) 1,652.27 (22.8) 
1952-86 1,828.99 (16.9) 2,108.79 (19.5) 
Source: External Assistance Staff, NEDA. 
a/ As a percentage of total ODA. 
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Table 4 
U.S. AND JAPANESE LOAN/GRANT MIX 
1952-1986 
(in %) 
Year Loan 
U.S. 
Grant 
JAPAN 
Loan Grant 
1952-61 8.6 91.4 - 100.00 a/ 
1962-70 4.5 95.5 - 100.00 a/ 
1971-79 30.6 69.4 81.8 18.2 . 
1980-86 22.1 77 . 9 80. 2 19.8 
a/ Japanese assistance in the 1950s and 1960s were provided 
through reparation payments in the form of grants. Loan 
assistance through OECF started only in 1971. 
Source: External Assistance Staff, NEDA 
10 
D. Interest Rate and Term Structure of ODA Loans. 
U.S. ODA loans carry an interest rate of 2.0 percent per 
annum during the first ten years (grace period) and 3.0 percent 
per annum thereafter for 30 years. 
Japan's interest rate and loan-term structure varies 
according to the economic situation of the grantee. It charges 
interest- rates ranging from 1.75 percent to 5.75 percent per 
annum depending on the capacity to pay of.the recipient country. 
For the, Philippines, the interest rate ranges from 3.0-3.5 
percent per annum, with a repayment period of 27-30 years, 
inclusive of a ten-year grace period. 3/ 
E. Sectoral Allocation 
There exists a marked difference as to the project 
destination of assistance extended by these two countries. 
Projects financed by USAID have been allocated as follows: (1) 
agriculture (58.0 percent); (2) social services (24.3 percent, 
78.0 percent of which has gone to health and population); (3) 
power and energy (10.8 percent); and (4) transportation (6.9 
percent). On the other hand, Japanese assistance has been 
devoted to: (1) energy (35". 2" percent) ; (2) transport and public 
works'. (31.2 percent); (3) industry (12.1 percent);,. (4) water 
resources (10.8 percent); (5) agriculture (7.7 percent); and (6) 
communications (3.0 percent). 
Generally, U.S. assistance has been more of the institution-
building type, while Japanese assistance has been largely focused 
on infrastructure support. Moreover, while the US has provided 
substantial support to social services, Japan has not done so to 
the same extent, because of the orientation of its assistance 
program. 
The direction of ODA from Japan and the U.S. has, of course, 
been largely influenced by policies set at home. While the 
orientation of Japanese ODA has remained unchanged, that of the 
US has undergone a number of shifts in emphasis. 
During the early 1950s, the thrust of U.S. assistance was 
geared towards the rebuilding of national institutions and the 
training of administrative and technical personnel to respond to 
the requirements of a growing development effort, particularly in 
the areas of agricultural production and education. Toward the 
latter half of the 1950s, the ODA's emphasis shifted to 
investment for industrial development and the improvement of 
3/ " 
The interest rate on OECF loans actually reached 4.25 
percent in 1979. This was subsequently brought down to 3.0 
percent in 1984. 
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management skills in government. The passage of the U.S. Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961 resulted in a gradual move from industrial 
development towards agricultural production, community 
development and a variety of social programs. By 1973, the 
thrust of U.S. assistance has been aimed at improving the 
conditions of the rural poor. 
F. ODA Planning and Programming 
Planning and programming of assistance funds' vary according 
to composition and source. 
1. ODA grants 
.For grants from the U.S. and Japan, the 'administrative 
structure and processes are basically the satne.::NEDA serves'" as 
the grant coordinator, and donors deal with it, as well as with 
other government departments, such as: (1) the :Department •-of 
Foreign Affairs (DFA) , "which serves as the diplomatic channel- ' of 
communication; (2) the Department of Budget and Management (DBM), 
in cases where the grant requires budgetary counterpart support; 
and (3) the recipient agencies. Before any grant-aid is 
released, a donor , country first advises NEDA on how- much 
assistance it would extend to the Philippine Government. NEDA 
then studies and reviews proposals submitted by the recipient 
agencies, and together with these agencies, negotiates the grant 
assistance with the donor country. 
Programming of ODA grants is done annually. With regard to 
Japan, annual missions are dispatched to formally discuss with 
the Philippine Government the programming of grant assistance. 
For the U.S., programming is done through informal consultations 
between USAID and NEDA, as the former maintains a fairly large 
mission in the Philippines. The USAID Office in Manila is manned 
by 98 technical personnel. The comparable figure for Japan, 
based on the number of technical personnel engaged in full-time 
ODA administration, is 24 (Embassy, seven; OECF, four; and JICA, 
13). Japan's handicap in aid administration comes out more 
clearly if one considers that in 1986, for example, Japan's aid 
program to the Philippines amounted to US$530.67 million, while 
the U.S. program totalled US$435.84 million. These translate to 
an ODA volume per staff of US$22.11 million for" Japan and US$4.45 
million for the U.S. 
In the case of the U.S., however, there is a cost to aid 
administration which the Philippines incurs. Office rental, 
housing', utilities, furniture and even educational allowance of 
children of USAID Mission officials and employees are borne by 
the Philippine Government. Salaries of local employees hired by 
the USAID Mission are also paid by the host government. In 1987, 
the cost of aid administration to the Philippine Government is 
estimated to amount to about US$2.7 million. This may seem to be 
a small sum compared to the annual U.S. ODA program. However, a 
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question of principle may be raised, as this arrangement is only 
true in the case of the USAID Mission in Manila. The cost of 
.maintaining the development assistance staffs of other bilateral 
donors in the Philippines accrue solely to their own account. 
2. ODA Loans 
ODA loan programming is more complex than that for grants, 
inasmuch as it involves the participation of several government 
agencies. There are significant differences between the U.S. and 
Japanese loan programming in terms of project identification and 
monitoring. 
In project identification, the U.S. takes the initiative in 
determining how much and for what purpose USAID loans should be 
allocated. Survey missions are dispatched to assess the economic 
needs, and situation of the Philippines. On the basis of their 
report, medium-term (five years) objectives and thrusts of 
assistance are defined for the Philippine Government; this is 
covered in its Country Development Strategy Statement (CDSS). 
Subsequently, the U.S. identifies the projects necessary to 
achieve the goals and objectives defined in its five-year 
program. _ USAID prepares the proposals and feasibility studies, 
sometimes with the assistance of foreign and local consultants. 
As -matter of practice, USAID consults NEDA prior to its 
presentation of proposals to Washington D.C. for approval. Upon 
approval by Congress, release of funds to implementing agencies 
is effected, with NEDA acting as the overall coordinator in the 
use of funds and in the monitoring of the progress of project 
implementation. 
In the case of Japan, projects are identified by the 
Philippine Government within the framework of its development 
plans. However, in some cases, Japan dispatches project-finding 
missions to determine economic areas that need to be tapped by 
the recipient country. Once the projects are identified, the 
Philippine Government prepares feasibility studies based on 
certain criteria and format required by the Japanese government. 
Where it is difficult for technical and/or financial reasons for 
the Philippines to prepare feasibility studies, OECF offers the 
following assistance: (1) technical assistance.from the Japan 
International Cooperation Agency (JICA) on a grant basis; and 
(2) Engineering Services Loan which finances detailed engineering 
and the preparation of tender documents. 
After the projects are identified and developed, these are 
submitted to OECF which then appraises the projects and issues 
pledges for those projects which it finds acceptable. The 
approval of the assistance package is then based on a consensus 
among four Japanese Ministries, namely: the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry and the Economic Planning Agency. 
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The Philippine Government is represented by an Implementing 
Officer (10) and a Secretariat in its dealings with various 
Japanese Government agencies. The 10 serves as the locus of 
coordination for the implementation of OECF-funded projects. 
It will be interesting to add that on the side of the 
Philippines, programming for ODA loans and grants is still very 
much centralized, reflecting the generally centralized nature of 
resource allocation decisions in government. Majority of the 
projects approved under Japanese ODA, for instance, are projects 
of central government departments. A handful fall under the 
category of local integrated area development projects, but 
components of these projects are implemented by central 
departments just the same. In the case of U.S. ODA, the 
institutional development orientation of the programs they have 
supported has tended to somewhat mitigate the centralized system 
of resource allocation. In fact, one of the continuing emphasis 
of U.S. assistance to the Philippines is the effort to help local 
governments become more self-reliant, in their developmental 
activities. 
The present government has committed itself to a policy of 
decentralization. In terms of ODA programming, concrete efforts 
are being taken to generate grassroots participation in the 
..identification, development and prioritization of development 
programs and projects. Projects proposed by central government 
departments are now required to have the imprimatur of the 
Regional Development Councils, in order to make sure that their 
proposed projects are in fact considered as high priority at the 
regional and sub-regional levels. 
G. Procurement 
Procurement of goods and services may either be tied or 
untied. In the case of the U.S., procurement of goods and 
services is generally tied to specific U.S. geographic codes, 
such as: 
Code 000 the United^States: including areas of US 
associated sovereignty. 
Code 899 Free_ World: any area in the Free World 
excluding the cooperating country. The Free World 
includes the following countries: Albania, Bulgaria, 
Cambodia, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, North Korea, 
Mongolia, Poland, Romania, USSR, Vietnam, Laos, German 
Democratic Republic and People's Republic of China. 
Code 935 Special Free World_: any area or country in 
the Free World, including the cooperating country 
itself. 
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Code 941 Selected Free World: any independent country 
in the Free- World, except the cooperating country 
itself and some European and other countries, such as: 
Andorra, Austria, Afghanistan, Libya, Yemen Arab 
Republic, etc. 
USAID loans normally specify that the source and origin of 
goods and services be Code 941 (Selected Free World) and the 
cooperating country. USAID grants normally specify that the 
source and origin of goods and services be Code 000 (the United 
States), while grants to the Relatively Less Developed Countries 
(RLDs) specify Code 941 (Selected Free World) and the 
cooperating country as the authorized source and origin for goods 
and services. Although procurement under USAID allows the 
procurement of goods and services from the U.S. and its allied 
countries, an inventory of USAID projects in the Philippines 
suggests that procurement of goods and services has come solely 
from the U.S. 
In the case of Japan, procurement of goods and services is 
generally untied; however, procurement of consultant services, 
financed out of OECF proceeds, is limited to Japan and less 
developed countries. Because of the advanced technology and 
experience of Japan compared with those of the less developed 
countries, Japanese firms invariably corner consultant services 
contracts. 
In the preparation of projects, consulting and engineering 
services provided by the Japanese use specifications based on the 
Japanese International Standards (JIS) , which tend to favor 
Japanese firms, manufacturers and general contractors in the 
bidding for capital goods (de Dios 1986, p. 45). Past experience 
shows that" virtually all capital goods contracts have been 
awarded to Japanese firms. There were instances, but very rare', 
when South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore won the international 
bidding for procurement of goods under OECF loans. 
Though it is not only true in the case of the Japanese, it 
has been observed that Japanese firms are very active in 
"lobbying" for projects within the country, in a way creating a 
demand for the goods and services they offer. in a number of 
instances, it has been reported that some Japanese firms go to 
the extent of promising grant or loan assistance from their 
government, provided their projects are endorsed by the 
Philippine Government. It has also been observed that the award 
of supply contracts for grant assistance does not seem to be 
subject to competitive bidding among Japanese firms. in one 
particular proposed grant assistance in which the authors have 
some knowledge of, the Japanese supplier had already been 
identified at the time that the preliminary proposal was being 
discussed. In fact, a representative of said supplier was a 
participant in the discussion of the proposed project. 
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H. Flowback of Aid to_Donor Country Per ^ Dollar of 
Assistance 
An attempt is made to measure how much per dollar of 
assistance to the Philippines flows back to the donor country in 
the form of procurement of goods and services. Data for the U.S. 
were obtained from USAID's statement of disbursements, which also 
contains whatever stipulation or conditions there might have 
been for tying the aid. Actual values for Japanese bilateral 
projects were provided by the recipient agencies; the flowback 
estimates are limited to OECF loans. Computations are based on 
completed projects in 1981-1985. The results are as follows: 
(1) For every dollar of assistance extended by the U.S., 
about US$0.33 represents the amount that flows back to the U.S. 
Of this component, 22.3 percent is devoted to consultancy 
services, and 77.7 percent to capital goods. Between grants and 
loans, the latter exhibit a lower amount of flowback to the U.S. 
(US$0.27 per dollar of assistance). 4/ 
(2) For Japan, examination of the loan agreements covering 
the projects completed in 1981-1985 gives the impression that, 
except for one project (River Dredging II), practically all of 
OECF loan proceeds flow back to Japan, all agreements indicating 
zero local currency cost. In actual practice, however, civil 
works contracts are normally awarded to Filipino firms 
notwithstanding the fact that the award of civil works contracts 
are subject to international competitive bidding. While these 
firms are paid by the Philippine Government in pesos, the latter 
is subsequently reimbursed by OECF in yen. Moreover, portions of 
consultancy contracts generally awarded to Japanese firms are 
subcontracted to Filipino firms in some instances. Accordingly, 
depending on the nature of project expenditures, the percentage 
of loan amount that reverts back to Japan varies. For projects 
involving civil works, the amount that flows back ranges from 
US$0.13 to US$0.37. For projects involving purely equipment 
procurement, the amount is from about US$0.35 to US$1.00. For 
projects involving both, the comparable figure is US$0.75 
US$0.95. 
I. Policy Conditionalities 
So far, there has been no policy conditionalities attached 
to Japanese ODA to the Philippines. In recent official 
consultations with Japanese missions to the Philippines, it has 
been indicated that -this approach is not likely to change in the 
foreseeable future. In the case of the U.S., no policy 
4/ 
The inclusion of 1986 will further improve the ratio for 
the U.S., inasmuch as ODA in the form of ESF all received in that 
year all went into budgetary support. 
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conditionalities were imposed on the Philippine Government's 
availment of ODA until 1985, when policy conditionalities were 
.required of a loan to finance rice importation under PL 480 Title 
I. The conditionalities involved specifically the elimination of 
the monopoly of the National Food Authority (NFA) in the 
importation of wheat, and that of the Fertilizer and Pesticide 
Authority in the importation of various fertilizers. 
The question of policy conditionalities is a sensitive 
political issue in the Philippines. There are those who feel 
that the imposition of policy conditionalities is a good way of 
"persuading" the government to adopt needed structural reforms. 
There are also those who believe that policy conditionalities 
would not be objectionable, provided that they are the things 
that the government would have done on its own anyway. At the 
other extreme, there are those who resent any policy 
conditionality, regardless of whether these are for or against 
the national interest, for reasons of national sovereignty. 
Oftentimes, the debate on policy issues become muddled, because 
the real issue of whether a policy is good or bad for the country 
is clouded by the cries against foreign intervention in the 
country. This is particularly true of the discussions involving 
tariff reform and import liberalization, where pressure from somg: 
aid donors for more substantive changes can cause a slowing down 
of the reform process or even a policy reversal, as lobby groups 
exploit the nationalist bandwagon. it is, therefore, highly 
preferable, from the viewpoint of a recipient country that no 
policy strings are attached to ODA. Aside from avoiding the kind 
of political issues they generate, ODA untied to any policy 
conditionality is more easily negotiated, more readily committed 
and more quickly disbursed. 
J. Summary Assessment 
For convenience, Table 5 summarizes the results of the 
comparative assessment of Japanese and U.S. ODA to the 
Philippines. In terms of quantity of assistance, it is clear 
that by the 1970s, Japan had overtaken the U.S. as the top 
bilateral source of ODA flows to the Philippines. In 1980-1986^, 
Japanese ODA to the Philippines totalled US$1.8 billion as 
compared to the U.S. ODA of US$1.0 billion. 
In terms of quality of ODA, however, the U.S. has the edge 
with respect to its grant-loan composition, interest rate and 
loan term structure and the proportion of assistance that does 
not revert back to the donor coQntry in the form of purchases of 
goods and services. On the sectoral allocation of aid, as well 
as its general orientation, there is no basis in saying that one 
is better than the other, because there is some complementarity 
involved in the allocation of assistance. in fact, there seems 
to be initiatives on both the U.S. and Japan to diversify the ODA 
that they provide: more "hard" assistance for the U.S. and more 
"soft" assistance for Japan. in the case of the latter, a 
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"Country Study for Development Assistance to the Republic of the 
Philippines" recommended that "in the future, there should be a 
significant increase in software-oriented assistance." 5/ 
With respect to ODA planning and programming, Japan's system 
is superior in the sense that it is the recipient country who 
identifies projects for considerati©n-,of the donor government. 
In the case of the U.S., project identification and selection is 
undertaken by USAID. Though the latter does consult Philippine 
Government agencies (particularly the NEDA) in the process, it 
does not detract from the fact that it is the U.S. rather than 
the Philippine Government which takes the initiative in the 
identification of projects. Finally, as regards policy 
conditionalities, Japanese ODA is not tied to such 
conditionalities, while U.S. ODA is. Certainly, aid that is not 
tied to policy conditionalities is preferable because among other 
reasons, it avoids the sort of political issues that policy 
conditionally generates. 
IV. SOME THOUGHTS ON THE FUTURE RODE OF JAPANESE AND U.S. ODA 
TO THE PHILIPPINES . . . 
Although this paper did not attempt to quantify the 
contribution of Japanese and U.S. ODA to Philippine economic 
development, it can be safely said that ODA from these two 
countries has indeed contributed positively to Philippine 
development. Japanese and U.S. ODA have supplemented domestic 
savings, making additional resources available for the 
establishment and strengthening of the institutional and physical 
infrastructure support necessary for the achievement of 
Philippine development goal.s. 6/ Needless to say, this does not 
detract from the fact that there are many imperfections in the 
aid giving and receiving process. As White aptly puts it: "In 
the history of aid, there are numerous cases of aid foolishly 
given, and even more foolishly accepted, the effect of which has 
been harmful. Every specialist in this field has his own 
collection of 'horror stories'." 7/ Among such horror stories, 
one can cite underutilized training facilities, overdesigned 
buildings, inappropriate tecnnology, incompatible array of 
equipment, and many others. But one can certainly make a list of 
"success stories" like school buildings, roads, health clinics, 
5/ 
A. Takahashi, "Country Study for Development Assistance to 
the Republic of the Philippines" (April 17, 1987), p. 4. 
y 
In 1980-1986, Japanese and U.S. ODA accounted for about 
one-fifth of foreign savings. 
V J. White, The Politics of Foreign Aid, St. Martin's Press, 
Inc., New York, N.Y., 1974, p. 22. 
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water supply systems particularly in the rural areas, irrigation 
facilities, power generation plants, major highways and bridges, 
ports and airports, and others. 
It is believed that Japanese and U.S. ODA to the Philippines 
will continue to play an important role in Philippine development 
efforts in the foreseeable future, considering the challenges 
posed by the need to alleviate mass poverty, reduce unemployment 
and underemployment and improve general living conditions, all of 
which have been made much more difficult by the economic decline 
of the last three years and the need to service a substantial 
external debt burden. 8/ 
To be sure, there are indications of the continuing 
importance of Japanese and U.S. ODA to the Philippines. For 
Japan, the NEDA Staff estimates that given a current annual level 
of assistance of ¥60-80 billion (US$0.5 billion) Japanese 
assistance may reach ¥400 billion (US$2.7 billion) in FY 1988-
FY1992 (April 1988-March 1992). In the case of the U.S., an 
indicative amount of US$1.0 billion has been reported for FY 
1988- FY1992 (September 1988-October 1992). 9/ 
Notwithstanding these indicative figures, there is some room 
for improvement in the levels of Japanese and U.S. ODA to the 
Philippines. Table 6 presents, by rank, the amount of U.S. and 
Japanese assistance extended to ASEAN countries, namely: 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, Singapore and Brunei. 
The table shows that the largest recipient of both U.S. and 
Japanese assistance so far is Indonesia. The Philippines ranks a 
far second for assistance coming from the U.S. and a far third 
for assistance coming from Japan. 
The terms and conditions as well as procedures involving 
Japanese and U.S. ODA to the Philippines can also stand 
improvement. In the case of the U.S., procedures which would 
allow the recipient country to have a more substantive 
participation in project identification and development could be 
adopted. Moreover, ways should be found in order to reduce the 
red tape in the disbursement of U.S. ODA. For Japan, the 
following can be considered: (1) the extension by Japan of 
W 
GNP contracted by 6.8 percent and 3.2 percent in 1984 and 
1985, respectively. As a result, real per capita income in 1985 
was just roughly equivalentto its level in 1975. Poverty 
incidence was estimated to be 60 percent of all families*. The 
unemployment rate was around 11 percent; the underemployment rate 
exceeded 30 percent. Debt service payments in 1986 accounted for 
32.0 percent of exports of goods and services. 
1/ FY 1988 Annual Budget Submission, "Long range plan by 
Appropriation Account," USAID, Washington, D.C. 
Table 6 
U.S. AND JAPANESE ASSISTANCE TO ASEAN NATIONS 
1961-1985 
(In US$M) 
mk U.S. a/ Amount Rank Japan Amount 
1 Indonesia 3,101.00 1 Indones ia 4,299.00 
2 Philippines 1,712.00 2 Thailand 2,469.57 
3 Thailand 853.40 3 Philippines 1,937.54 
4 Malays ia 71.40 4 Malaysia 1,333.64 
5 S ingapore - 5 Singapore 3.50 
6 Brunei 6 Brunei _ 
a/ For U.S. FY 1962- FY 1985. 
Sources of Data: USAID, US Overseas Loans and Grants, July 
1, 1945-September 30, 1985, 1985. 
OECF, Japan's Contribution to Economic 
Development in the Republic of the Phil-
ippines , April 1984. 
Japan's Official Development Assistance, 
1984 and 1985 Annual Reports. 
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softer loan terms (lower interest rate and longer repayment 
period); (2) the progressive increase in the share o.f grants of 
Japanese ODA from the current 18-20 percent to at least 50 
percent; (3) the complete untying of consultancy services under 
OECF loans; (4) increase in local cost financing beyond the 
ceiling of 30 percent; (5) extension of more program or sector 
loans; and (6) conduct of competitive bidding among Japanese 
firms in the case of projects involving grant assistance. Aside 
from these, other modalities of financing could probably be 
pursued. One such modality is co-financing with other bilateral 
agencies and multilateral institutions. 
How about effectiveness of Japanese and U.S. -ODA? This is 
an important but tricky subject and is related to the issue of 
aid evaluation. The main question is whether or not the 
implementation of donor-supported development programs has made 
any difference at all to the targetted program beneficiaries. A 
report prepared by the Swedish International Development 
Authority (SIDA) on aid evaluation concluded that little emphasis 
has been placed on this question in the past by both donor and; 
recipient countries. 10/ USAID supported a major activity in the; 
Philippines in 1978 along this line, but the Philippine 
Government and USAID have not adequately followed-up the effort 
towards its institutionalization. No such initiative has come 
from Japan. 
There are at least two (not mutually exclusive) ways in 
which this gap in aid planning and policymaking in the 
Philippines (and elsewhere) can be addressed. First, the U.S. 
and Japan can consider providing assistance to the Philippine 
Government towards strengthening the evaluation capacities of the 
appropriate government agencies. Second, they can also consider 
integrating or piggy-backing evaluation components into programs 
and projects that they finance. USAID has done the latter to 
some extent, particularly in the case of the Bicol River Basin 
Project. 
This paper would not be complete if iz concluded by simply 
saying what the donors should do to improve tne impact of their 
assistance to the Philippines. Although the donors can improve 
the quantity and quality of their assistance, the ultimate impact 
of such assistance will still depend on how effectively and 
efficiently the recipient country is able to use the assistance. 
The ball ends up with the Philippine Government which must 
continuously strengthen its capability in investment programming, 
program implementation, monitoring and evaluation and, as a 
whole, its absorptive capacity for aid utilization. 
10/ 
L. Johansson and M. Paves, Aid Evaluation as a Form, of 
Development Cooperation - What Can Donors Do? A report- submitted 
by SIDA to the DAC/OECD" Expert Group on Aid Evaluation (SIDA: 
Stockholm, Sweden), April 1984. 
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